Introduction:

Reviewing Strategic Culture in the Russian Neighborhood

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This is a book about the complex relations and entanglements of countries in Russia's neighborhood from the perspective of strategic culture. The Eastern European and the Eurasian space went through a dramatic transformation over the past decades, since the collapse of the communist system and the end of the Cold War. The countries that belonged to the Soviet Block were free to re-evaluate their societal organization, political line and international alliances. The enlargement of Western institutions to territories that were considered previously a Soviet sphere of influence altered the Cold War's East-West balance of great power politics. 14 independent states, in addition to the Russian Federation, emerged in the space of the former Soviet Union – all of which started to develop own policies and make independent strategic choices. The fall of Soviet Union affected also the Nordic countries enabling their regional cooperation as well as new institutional memberships. Even if Nordic countries did not belong to the Soviet Block, they were influenced by the closeness of the Soviet Union and the Cold War environment restricted their actions. This was especially the case in relation to Finland.

Russian foreign policy, however, has not always shown adaptability to these fundamental changes and was keen to maintain continuity in its relationship with its neighborhood based on principles of great power politics. Due to these continuities in perceptions, behavior patterns and political culture, Russian foreign policy attitudes have been accordingly tailored

to different regions and sometimes differently to individual countries within the same region – a vital aspect that academic research has often neglected.

For the countries in Russia's neighborhood, historical experiences have influenced foreign policy decisions, as well. Russia, nevertheless, has not been perceived solely as a security hazard but from a far more complex perspective of potential and mutual advantages, based on manifold interdependences. The national perceptions and policies regarding Russia have been strongly rooted in the countries' traditions, histories, experiences and political culture – in other words in their strategic culture. This aspect, it could be argued, has been overlooked both in Russia and in the Western countries. A deeper understanding of small and medium size countries in between Russia and the West should be developed in today's world politics, where conflict and competition are increasing and alliances are renegotiated.

Changing Spatiality of Security Conceptions

The spatial context is particularly relevant in this volume because we are dealing with a special European *in-between* area where Russian and Western interests have clashed over centuries – and this circumstance affects the manoeuvring of the countries in this region. Still, looking at the area from the outside, many tend to think that whenever the power balance between Russia and the West changed it inevitably modified also the strategic thinking in these countries. The most common misperception is that the post-communist transformation self-evidently brought about a profound change in strategic culture. This volume's starting point is that there are deeper continuities of attitudes, conceptions and behaviour patterns that survived the collapse of the communist system because their roots reach far back in history.

Consequently, the integration of post-communist countries in the late 1990s and 2000s to NATO and EU[1] did not represent a dramatic turn, as it has often been presented. This assumption invites us to dig deeper into the concept of strategic culture and investigate how strategic culture evolves over history and what factors contribute to it. This volume will analyse Serbia, Ukraine, Belarus, as well as regional entities, Black Sea countries, the Baltic States, Nordic countries and Visegrad-members, from the four aspects of strategic culture: military security, economic relations and energy dependence, and identity.

One of the most enduring aspects of strategic culture, relating to small and medium size countries in the in-between area is being a *security consumer*. This applies especially to those countries that are members of NATO and previously were members of the Warsaw Pact, during the Cold War. Being a security consumer has a peculiar advantage. Integration to a security organization, such as NATO or the Warsaw Pact, gave elbowroom to turn to other, nationally perhaps even more important, strategic goals when the immediate military security worries were solved by the membership. There are also countries in this volume that differ in this respect; Finland, Sweden and Serbia, that were militarily non-allied during and after the Cold War.

The *Economic ties and energy issues* have also been one of the most discussed topics. In the 1990s, perhaps the golden era of liberal institutionalism, interdependence was assumed to bring integration and a feeling of inclusiveness. The EU enlargement was an example of economic integration. The accession has benefited the "new" Eastern members, in absolute terms, receiving considerable structural support aiming to decrease the gap between Eastern and Western standards of living. Thus, national strategies have been centered around a wider security conception reflecting on preserving political and societal stability by ensuring

economic prosperity and energy supply. Hence, the EU was seen accordingly as a non-military security provider institution. These advantages of the EU were propagated also to the Eastern neighborhood countries, Serbia, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus, aiming to strengthen their Western orientation and counter-balance Russian influence. The EU was, however, unable to establish a deeper value-based socialization of the new member countries. Several Eastern members have started to show signs of reverse evolution, the weakening of the rule of law, an increasing centralization of power, attacks against the freedom of judiciary, a diminishing elbowroom of media and civil society. These developments have shown that economic integration and interdependence do not always translate into societal and political convergence, and hence new barriers and dividing lines have re-emerged in Europe.

Identity does not always respect man made borders negotiated and sealed with agreements. During the Cold War, the Iron Curtain did not prevent East-West multilevel interactions.[2] Especially countries that are positioned in-between two clearly different entities are challenged every time when international political dynamics change. It also means that the special in-between position of all countries presented in this volume is subject to pendulum-like swings between the bipolar magnetism of divergent Eastern and Western models, and this affects the evolution of strategic culture.

In-between-ness is a multidimensional concept, not limited to countries between Russia and the West. In geography, Russia is a large country penetrating deep into both Europe and Asia, placing Russia geopolitically in between Europe and Asia.[3] Russia's position in Europe has always been difficult and caused more conflict than cooperation with the other European countries. Russia's choices and drastic changes from authoritarian tsarism to socialism, and then to a political limbo between democracy and authoritarianism – was seen on several

occasions as a security hazard from European perspectives. Furthermore, these political transformations were perceived as 'non-European' solutions. Russia also has a biased relation to Europe and the West, based on an identity dilemma that has affected the nature of the foreign policy of Russia since the 19th and early 20th century. In the case of Russian security perceptions, economics especially in energy issues as well as in identity and cultural ties have affected its strategic culture and debates inside of Russia. In these debates three main lines emerged competing for the leading place defining the foreign policy establishment.[4]

Russian statists, resembling the Western realist thinking, believe that foreign policy should be guided by national interests defined realistically with regard to the geopolitical security situation, domestic economic objectives and available resources. The statists claim that Russia has been, is and will be a great power with global outreach, in the same category with China and the United States. In the world of great power competition there is little room for independent foreign policy for smaller states that are seen as pawns on the chess board situated in the spheres of interest. It can be argued that the statists are the most influential group in current Russian foreign policy.

For the Russian liberal school, the Westernizers (*zapadniki*), Russia needs to become a modern state in the Western style because the West represents the most viable and progressive civilisation in the world. For the Westernizers Europe is the civilizational reference point. They place Russia as part of Europe and the European norm and value system, and expect a proper integration into European and Western institutions. For Westernizers the ideas of multilateralism and international cooperation are essential elements of international politics. This group has been the most disappointed in the way Russia's relationships with rest of

Europe and other Western states have developed, too often blaming the deteriorating relations on the West.

The last group, the civilizationists (or *nationalists*)[5] see the international environment as hostile where the West is a threat to Russian values. Foreign policy should reflect Russian civilizational uniqueness and the idea of the 'Russian Empire' of Slavic and orthodox unity. They object to both Western and Asian influence, placing Russia firmly in-between the East and the West. This group has difficulties in drawing a line between Russia and the West, which blurs the picture of what is Russian civilization. However, despite the blurriness, this group can be seen as very influential when it comes to the Russian neighbourhood, since its arguments are based on identity, historical memory and cultural ties.

These Russian strategic cultural groups highlight also the complexities rising from inside of Russia affecting, in different ways in different times, Russia's relationship with its neighbours. This has relevance in how the countries in the Russian neighbourhood define their security risks, understand threats and how their strategic culture evolves.

Theoretical Building Blocks

This book elaborates the concept of strategic culture and therefore we want to address some central theoretical debates that we found particularly useful for developing our approach. It is fascinating how much the evolution of theory was actually indebted to the Cold War juxtaposition. The bipolarity of the superpowers crucially downplayed the relevance of national aspects relating to cooperation, competition, conflict and war. The "national

character" of the enemy played an important role in the public discourses until the end of the Second World War.[6] The conceptual change was partly due to nuclear weapons that supposedly would make great powers behave similarly and the possibility of mass destruction made cultural differences irrelevant.[7] Furthermore, during the Cold War the rational-actor theories of strategic behavior dominated the security studies.

Amongst several scholars, Colin S Gray, however, cautioned already in 1971 that it would be a mistake and create a dangerous illusion of safety to treat Soviet threat perceptions and decision-making processes as analogues to US threat perceptions and decision-making.[8] Jack Snyder introduced the notion of *strategic culture* in 1977 and defined it *as* '*the sum total of ideals, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of the national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to [nuclear] strategy*'.[9] Snyder established his ideas on the concept of political culture, which was developed by Gabriel Abraham Almond and Sidney Verba in the 1960s. Political culture contained shared experiences and common memories, rooted in nationally anchored religion, customs, language and history, all of which provided a framework for decision making.[10]

Since Snyder's work, three generations of theorists emerged disputing the role of culture in security policy and strategic behavior. The emblematic controversy, known as the 'Gray and Johnston debate', was carried out between the first and second generations of scholars of security. [11] The first, influenced by the *cultural turn* of social sciences, presented a holistic and determinist position claiming that since all politics take place within the realm of culture every nation produces inevitably culture-specific strategic decisions. This approach was contested for its semi-permanent, homogenizing and essentialist perspective of national

culture. The second generation of scholars advocated a limited role of culture in political decision-making, distinguishing between culturally-anchored decisions and rational choices. These views were criticized because of the positivist effort to demarcate the cultural component off from 'normal' or 'rational' behavior in strategic decisions. The third generation mediated between the first two by introducing the significance of institutions and organizations which are culturally embedded and prone to continuity, thus having profound effect on the practice of policy-making.[12] These ideas were questioned by linking 'culture' to institutions.[13] Furthermore similar developments occurred inside the neo-realist school. As John Glenn has observed "*The mid-nineties witnessed the emergence of a new school of realists that sought to move beyond the basic insights of Waltzian neorealism by investigating the interaction of systemic pressures and domestic processes in the foreign policy decision making process, thus providing a much richer explanatory account of why states choose certain foreign policies over others*".[14]

These theoretical stepping stones provide an important wider framework but we need to pinpoint also the more direct building blocks of our theoretical undertaking. We agree with Stuart Poore that non-cultural or material variables become meaningful for security considerations only through culture that conditions understanding.[15] Ann Swindler's work reminded that culture can be understood as a warehouse providing a great variety of means for decision-makers to choose and determine their policies – thus culture offers the means but not the ends of strategic policy.[16] According to Kerry Longhurst, strategic culture is shaped by formative experiences which can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures.[17] Equally important was the point made by Keohane, Katzenstein and Krasner that strategic behavior always reveals its underlying intersubjective nature – based on mutually created identities and shared meanings.[18]

Alan Bloomfield suggested that strategic culture contained multiple co-existing strategic subcultures. Each subculture presents a different interpretation of a state's international social/cultural context – who are a state's friends and foes, and what exactly are the material variables relevant to strategic decision-making – geography, relative power, technological change etc.[19]. Bloomfield notes that the sub-groups "*exist in changeable relations of dominance, subordination and latency relative to each other*"[20]. This relationship between the groups can explain changes in a particular country's foreign policy while some underlying features are maintained. For this volume two points in Bloomfield's interpretation are especially important: historical threat perceptions play a significant role in the strategic decision-making process when it comes to choosing whom to trust and whom to fear, and the different sub-groups use a mix of social/cultural and material/technical factors to compete with each other to offer the 'most accurate' interpretation of the state's international context[21]. The ideas mentioned above were vital for developing our own theoretical approach to analyze strategic culture.

In-between Strategic Culture: towards a New Approach

In this book, we focus on a very special regional phenomenon deriving from geopolitical in-between-ness. The geographical position *in between* two ideologically, politically or economically divergent great entities (like East–West, communism–capitalism, democracy–authoritarianism) affects a state's security considerations and policy perspectives. The concept of in-between-ness in itself is not new: already in 1919 Sir Harold Mackinder proposed a supranational state, Europe in-between, which would serve as a strong *buffer zone*

between Germany and Russia. Mackinder's "supranational" state area consisted of the Baltic states, Poland, Great Bohemia, Great Romania, Great Serbia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Greece.[22] Mackinder's buffers are very much in line also with this book's geographical area. As Sami Moisio has observed, "*'Europe in-between' gained its geopolitical relevance during an era of inter-imperial rivalry from 1875 to 1945. This rivalry was primarily about the occupation of territories, for economic success and the future of a particular state were seen to be based on fixed territorial resources and the geographical extent of the territory*."[23] Especially that period of history has been central in shaping the strategic culture of the countries in this volume. Nevertheless, current political analyses have often overlooked the multiple layers of historical influences that can be traced back even centuries.

In geopolitical literature, the countries of the *in-between* are most commonly referred to as *buffer zone* entities indicating that they carry a particular weight (military security, political or economic value) for outside powers. More precisely, a 'buffer' means a space in between two antagonist poles, where at least one of them considers that area to be of primary importance for its strategic interests. This often creates a basis for competition where the other pole is likely to challenge this claim over the territory. Buffer zone thinking is closely related to the phenomenon of the sphere of influence, which expands the concept of security to various other fields, from economy to societal development and culture. The purpose of the sphere of influence is to strengthen and deepen an area's buffer potential by accommodating its values, political system, social and economic structures with the power that exercises it. Being subjected to a buffer zone or sphere of influence inevitably creates a security concern for the countries in the in-between space.

The fluctuation between the different poles is reflected in the concept of strategic culture, relying on the warehouse of various versions of 'meaningful' history. Interpretations of the past serve not only as argumentative means for intended policy but also provide a mental map to how security is traditionally conceived and identity constructed. Hence, there are some core national images and narratives relating to in-between-ness that acquire a central place in strategic discourse. Therefore, we are trying to answer the key questions of this book: in what forms in-between regionality affects the countries' strategic culture and in what respect countries diverge from this common experience?

Furthermore, the seemingly stable historical images actually represent continuous change because historical understanding is always dependent on its own temporal socio-political context. Thus, the same historical event inevitably gets a new 'reading' in every usage. From this perspective, the volume also asks when and how security actors decide to change the set of 'traditional' history images from their warehouse, and what are the drivers of this change?

Countries in the Russian Neighborhood

This volume provides an angle of Russia's European neighboring regions and countries. In all cases regional in between-ness can be detected in the individual countries' strategic culture. The focus is on describing and analyzing the broader trends of change and continuity especially in relation to Russia. The studies in this book bring light on the regional aspects of historical experiences, pragmatic strategies, security perceptions and their impact on the countries' attitudes towards Russia. We also discuss the complex interrelatedness of domestic and foreign political power-play vis-à-vis Russia. By doing so the volume will also shed light

on current developments in Europe and perhaps even help towards a better understanding of integration processes as well as Russia's role in these complex relations.

All the chapters dealing with different country-cases and sub-regions elaborate, as their common prism of investigation, the multiple interdependences between security perceptions, economic development considerations and identity-formulations. Depending on the country and region one element might be more dominant than the others. We understand all of these elements as fluid and ever-changing constructions – subjects of constant debates of strategic subcultures. These factors are also deeply intertwined and precondition each other. The contributions of this volume discuss the notion of security in its wider definition comprising also an overall conception of societal security of the national and regional space. Economic relations, and particularly resource and energy dependence have an important relevance on how countries are exposed to power centers. Identity construction is the most fundamental component affecting national strategic culture. Identity has an impact on how security is perceived in the temporal and spatial context and reflects also the pragmatic realities of development scenarios.

We pinpoint the complex mutual game where Russia is trying to influence how the states formulate their foreign policy but also domestic choices, and how, on the other hand, the countries' elites deploy the Russian card in their own infighting for power or make regional alliances. In addition, the interdependence of the countries within the different regions in connection to common positioning to Russia, and the regions as entities' relation with Russia is discussed in depth.

The book is comprised of four parts. In the *first* section Jeremy Smith presents the different dimensions of Russian strategic culture. He argues that the notion of responsibility has shaped Russian strategic culture towards the countries within its immediate neighborhood and beyond. The use of the idea of responsibility has varied and sometimes extended to particular national groups as ethnic Russians, adherents of the Orthodox religion, or to particular territories, such as the countries of the former Soviet Union. In addition, Russian strategic culture is affected by regional differences based on the geographical location of neighboring countries to the West, South, or East. Furthermore, regions are associated with comparative developmental status, seen as advanced, backwards, or similar to the level of Russia. These different dimensions of strategic culture bear relevance on the variations of Russian neighborhood policy towards different regions and countries.

In the *second* section the volume focuses on the Nordic and Central European region, starting with Hanna Smith's article that looks at the four Nordic countries; Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden from a historical perspective, tracing strategic culture changes and continuities far back in history. The four countries have very different security arrangements and policies, however there are similarities in relation to Russia and although different formats, also in the identity of in-between-ness. These two elements have enhanced, maintained and shaped the Nordic regional identity.

From Nordic countries the next step is the Baltic states. Kristīne Atmante-Berge, Riina Kaljurand and Tomas Jermalavičius map the different historical periods that have resulted in two important concepts in today's strategic culture in all three Baltic states; "never again" and "never alone". They then examine how the two external shocks; the war in Georgia 2008 and the annexation of Crimea followed by the war in Eastern Ukraine altered Lithuanian and Latvian strategic cultures in particular. The chapter highlights the differences of the three

Baltic states in their strategic cultures even if all of them share the main and dominant security concern; the Russian Federation.

The second section is concluded with Katalin Miklóssy's and Justyna Pierzynska's chapter that elaborates two cases of the Visegrad alliance, Hungary and Poland. They distinguish between long-term strategic culture and short-term strategic behavior, and claim that common responses to shared historical challenges are due to the similar limitation of the geopolitical space and the resembling *modus operandi*. Divergences originated from the different *means* applied because the countries were dissimilarly furnished with resources, and had some special national agendas. Miklossy and Pierzynska argue that space and modus operandi are characteristically long-term elements of strategic culture whereas means are typically related to short-term strategic behaviour.

The *third* part looks at the Black Sea region. Katalin Miklóssy and Silviu Miloiu start the section by analyzing the interlinked-ness of Romanian and Moldovan strategic culture that in both states evolved historically around the concept of the ideal state, and in which Russia played a significant role. The idea of the ideal state is grounded in clashing national identities and constitutes national consensus. To achieve this paramount national goal, both countries' elites take advantage of the in-between position and actively use both the Russian and EU cards in domestic, regional and international strategies.

Then Dragomir Stoyanov looks at the temporal dimension of Bulgarian strategic culture and argues that the persistence of the opposition between pro-West or pro-Russia groups is not an anachronism carried over from 19th century, but rather an actual dilemma conditioned by Bulgaria's position in the regional balance of power. The chapter goes through shifts in

Bulgarian strategic culture with historical examples and analyses the current situation through political parties' positions towards NATO and the EU. The chapter identifies four subcultures within Bulgarian strategic culture: pro-Western, pro-Russian, and pro-Turkish, and the subculture of pragmatic balancers that all need to be understood if one seeks to understand Bulgaria's foreign and security policy choices.

The third section is concluded by Toni Alaranta's analysis of Turkey's two competing strategic culture paradigms, representing complex relationships with the West and Russia. The Kemalist Republican paradigm has been built around domestic westernization and Western-oriented foreign policy. In contrast, the imperial strategic culture, defined as "Eurasianism" is primarily a cultural-civilizational doctrine seeking regional power positions for Turkey. Alaranta claims that while in both paradigms there is a special place on how to come to terms with Russia, the Erdogan-era is driving the Eurasianist agenda and strategic cooperation with Russia even at the expense of confrontation with the West.

The *fourth* and last part examines the countries that could be counted in as Slavic Brotherhood countries, displaying assumedly a special traditional affinity to Russian interests. Milan Subotic and Milan Igrutinovic state that Serbia's strategic culture has been dominated by two incompatible orientations: Russian–Serbian closeness, based on historical experience of war alliances, cultural kinship and shared orthodox religion, represents an important segment of Serbian identity discourse. This is now tested by the country's EU-drive and implemented Europeanisation policy. The half-hearted EU interest in Serbia's accession, however, reinforces the mythologization of Slavic brotherhood and anti-Western sentiment, which is assisted by an active Russian policy in the region.

The countries of Slavic Brotherhood also encompass Ukraine that has perhaps experienced the most profound changes of all the countries in this book. Mark Teremae tries to trace Ukrainian strategic culture in the time of the internal turmoil as well as uncertainty of how the relationship with Russia will turn out in the future. Even if contemporary relations with Russia are very constrained, the part of Ukrainian strategic culture that has argued for dialogue with Russia, remains influential. Teremae argues that as long as Ukrainian domestic and foreign policy wavers depending on which subculture is ascendant in a kind of zero-sum game, the country will experience instability.

In the last part of the fourth section Matthew Frear looks at Belarus that has been variously portrayed as a 'denationalized nation' or a 'semi-sovereign state'. However, when looking closely Belarusian strategic culture emerges in different formats. Minsk has attempted to play the role of a 'free radical' that is not just attached to one centre of power. At the same time, it engages in 'strategic hedging' between various powers, with the aim of pursuing a path of 'sovereignty entrepreneurship' to monetize geopolitical loyalty for maximum benefit. In doing so, foreign-policy decision making in Belarus has drawn from a more diverse range of potentially contradictory narratives and traditions. During the Lukashenka presidency, relations with Moscow and the wider world in the context of strategic culture have been involving and adapting. Belarusian strategic culture has expanded to appropriate a wider range of subcultures. However, it remains to be seen how long Belarus can play the game of drawing on at times contradictory strategic cultures to meet short-term needs.

All of the chapters address the importance of history, security perceptions and in-between-ness as part of strategic culture. Bloomfield's argument relating to strategic culture sub-cultures comes through in all chapters. Through the prism of strategic culture, the volume also

sheds light on the bases of strategic decisions of the countries in Russia's neighborhood and the role of Russia in particular. A complex and nuanced picture emerges that clearly shows how important it is to understand each country's strategic culture first and foremost. Only by looking from the inside towards the outside, not from outside in, we can learn and understand the different turns and misperceptions relating to countries in the Russian neighborhood.

Notes:

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[1] NATO-membership of the post-communist countries was acquired by Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary in 1999; by the Baltic States, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia in 2004; by Albania and Croatia in 2009; by Montenegro in 2017. EU membership was granted by Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, the Baltic states, Slovenia in 2004; Romania and Bulgaria in 2007; Croatia 2013.

[2] Sari Autio-Sarasmo – Katalin Miklóssy, "Introduction," to *Reassessing Cold War Europe,* eds. S. Autio-Sarasmo and K. Miklóssy, (London-New York: Routledge, 2011, 2014), 1 – 15.

[3] Hanna Smith, "Statecraft and Post-Imperial Attractiveness: Eurasian Integration and Russia as a Great Power," *Problems of Post-Communism* vol. 63, no. 3 (2016): 171–82.

[4] Traditionally the common way of breaking the Russian political society into groups is to define three categories in Russian foreign policy thinking. Some examples: Margot Light, "Foreign policy thinking," in *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy*, eds. N. Malcolm, A. Pravda, R. Allison and M. Light (Oxford: Royal Institute of International Affairs and Clarendon Press, 1996), 34. Vladimir Lukin, "Our Security Predicament," *Foreign Policy*, no. 88 (Autumn 1992), 65–6. Pushkov identifies four groups: Alexei Pushkov, "Russia and

America: Honeymoon's Over," *Foreign Policy*, no. 93 (Winter1993-94), 78–81. Nicole J. Jackson, *Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS – Theories, debates and action* (London-New York: Routledge, 2003), 36–7. Alla Kassianova, "Russia: Still Open to the West? Evolution of the State Identity in the Foreign Policy and Security Discourse," *Europe-Asia Studies* 53, no. 6 (2001), 824.

[5] See e.g. Iver B. Neumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe* (London: Routledge, 1996).

[6] Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 141–70.

[7] Desch, "Culture Clash," 145.

[8] Colin Gray, "What Rand Hath Wrought," *Foreign Policy*, no. 4 (Autumn 1971): 118.

[9] Jack Snyder, *Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for nuclear Option* (Santa Monica: RAND Cooperation, 1977).

[10] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civil Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[11] Colin Gray, "National Styles in Strategy: The American Example," *International Security* 6, no. 2 (1981): 21–47. Colin Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back," *Review if International Studies* 25, no. 1 (1999): 49–69. Alistair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (1995): 32–64. Kenneth Booth, "The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed," in *Strategic Power: USA/USSR*, ed. C. G. Jabobsen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 121–8.

[12] Elisabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (1995): 65–93.

[13] Iver B. Neumann and Henrikki Heikka, "Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice: The Social Roots of Nordic Defense," *Cooperation and Conflict* 40, no. 1 (2005): 5–23. Vincent

Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 5.

[14] John Glenn, "Realism versus strategic culture: Competition and Collaboration?", *International Studies Review 11*, (2009): 523–51.

[15] Stuart Poore, "What is the context? A Reply to the Gray-Johnson Debate on Strategic Culture," *Review of International Studies 29*, no. 2 (2003): 279–84.

[16] Ann Swindler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 2 (1986): 273–86.

[17] Kerry Longhurst, "The Concept of Strategic Culture," in *Military Sociology*, ed. G. Kummel and A. Prufert (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000), 301–10.

[18] Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane and Stephen Krasner, "International Organization and the Study of World Politics," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 645–85. Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 171–200.

[18] Alan Bloomfield, "Time to Move on: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate," *Contemporary Security Policy* 30, no. 3 (2012): 437–61.

[19] Alan Bloomfield, "Time to Move on: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate," *Contemporary Security Policy* 30, no. 3 (2012): 437–61.

[20] Alan Bloomfield, "Time to Move on: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate," *Contemporary Security Policy* 30, no. 3 (2012): 452.

[21]Ibid. 453–56.

[22] Harold Mackinder, 'The Geographical Pivot of History', *Geographical Journal* vol.13, no. 3 (1904): 421–37. Harold Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction* (Westport CT: Greenwood Press 1919/1981).

[23] Sami Moisio, Competing Geographies of Sovereignty, Regionality and Globalisation: The Politics of EU Resistance in Finland 1991–1994, *Geopolitics*, vol.11, no. 3, (2006): 439–64.

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